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 by Rav Carlotti  
Advisor: Mark Ungar  
 
 
What is causing the surge in human displacement around the world?  Large-scale 
displacement in Syria, Yemen, Honduras, and Venezuela has generated  unprecedented 
humanitarian crises in Latin America and the Middle East as millions of displaced people end up as 
refugees or immigrants. Humanitarian organizations like the UNHCR and host countries have had 
their resources overextended by these ongoing crises,  and there is no end in sight. This thesis 
shows that contemporary human displacement is rooted is the increasingly inability of governments 
to manage their societies amid great political demands and socio-economics strains.  These causes 
are difficult to tackle because they require far-reaching reforms in theses countries’ governments 
and economies. While humanitarian aid is a beneficial stop gap measure to help displaced people, it 
is a temporary solution.  As this thesis will show,  the only way to protect people in the long-term 
is by working with the global communities to promote representative leadership and peaceful 
resolution of political differences. The global community can also offer support to the government 
to prevent militias and splinter groups from challenging its authority and putting the lives of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter one: Introduction 
Human displacement, which is also referred to as forced migration or forced displacement, 
is the coerced and involuntary movement of people from their home area due to factors beyond 
their control. The movement can result from a wide range of factors including population transfer, 
deportation, civil war, persecution, ethnic cleansing, droughts, and natural disasters.1 The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) limits the definition of human 
displacement to the movement that is the result of human rights violations, generalized violence, 
conflict, and persecution.2 The issue of forced displacement received attention in the policies and 
discussions of the international community since the start of the European migrant crisis.3. Local, 
regional, and international organizations are working towards preventing and addressing the effects 
of human displacement in both origin and destination countries.  
But why is human displacement so persistent? Given the long history, global extent, and 
huge impacts of human displacement, why has the world been unable to stem it?   Since the start of 
the 21st century, in fact, the numbers may be at record levels.  Currently, at least 60 million people - 
most of them being from the southern part of the planet – are considered to be forcibly displaced.4 
The goal of this thesis will be to comparatively investigate human displacement in modern times in 
Syria, Yemen, Venezuela, and Honduras.  Specifically, it will link quantitative trends, particularly 
                                                
1 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Elise Pizzi, “Natural Disasters, Forced Migration, and Conflict: The 
Importance of Government Policy Responses,” International Studies Review (2020). 
2 Tajamul Maqbool, “Global Scenario of Conflict Induced Displacement: A Survey of Literature,” 
Research Review Journals in Research Review International Journal of Multidisciplinary (2019): 
46–50. 
3 Brendan Ciarán Browne and Casey Asprooth-Jackson, “From 1969 to 2018: Relocating Historical 
Narratives of Displacement during ‘the Troubles’ through the European Migrant Crisis,” Capital and 
Class 43, no. 1 (2019): 23–38. 
4 Kylie Bourne, “Beitz’s Two-Level Model of Human Rights and Statelessness,” in Political and 
Legal Approaches to Human Rights (Routledge, 2017), 214–225. 
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the numbers of displaced people by year, with the changing conditions that cause such 
displacement.  This focus will show that human displacement is so universal, persistent, and 
difficult to curb because its causes are deeply rooted and constantly changing.  But one of their 
shared causes in the current era, as this study will show, is that governments are losing control over 
the societies they govern.  As control is lost, repression and violence increase, generating human 
displacement. The patterns and forms of such violence are different, but they have similar sources 
and results, as this thesis’s four different case studies will show. 
After the qualitative and quantitative data has been collected, it will be aggregated into a 
report and presented in a thesis with Four chapters and a conclusion. The countries that are the 
focus of the report will be compared in pairs:  Syria and Yemen as one pair, and Honduras and 
Venezuela as the other. Each chapter’s sections will provide a thematic guideline for the report 
within which human displacement in Syria, Yemen, Honduras, and Venezuela will be discussed. 
During the investigation, it will be possible to examine the most common forms and causes of 
human displacement in modern societies. In addition, the research process will provide insights 
into the similarities and differences between different forms of displacement including 
displacement resulting from natural disasters, climate change, weak governance, and lack of social 
support.  
The research for this project will be based on data from the United Nations (UN), the 
International Organization of Migration, World Vision, the Council of Europe, and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, among others. In addition to these primary sources, 
secondary sources like articles from peer-reviewed journal articles will be used to supplement 
information and explore the impact of human displacement in the 21st century.5  Even governments 
                                                
5 Ilona Millar, “There’s No Place Like Home: Human Displacement and Climate Change,” 
Australian International Law Journal 14 (2007): 71; Anastasios Noulas et al., “A Tale of Many 
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have data on the displacement of people from places across the world, especially those that are 
seeking harbor in other countries either as refugees or asylum seekers.6 The data collected gives an 
approximate number of the people who have been displaced over the years, but this data does not 
always include the reasons for these changes. Investigating human displacement in Latin American 
nations and the Middle East will make it possible to understand the trends in both regions. 
Comparing countries in those two regions will be instrumental in determining if there are region-
specific factors that relate to human displacement. The comparison will also be an important step in 
gaining a clearer understanding of the social and political conditions behind the human 
displacement phenomenon in the four countries.  
Causes of Displacement   
Human displacement results due to a wide range of factors, which can be classified into 
three broad categories including conflict-induced displacement, disaster-induced displacement, and 
development-induced displacement.7 The causes of displacement can also be placed into two 
categories including displacement of risk and displacement of adaptation.8 The displacement of risk 
includes deportations, conflict-induced displacement, and disaster-induced displacement, whereby 
a person is forced to leave when risks increase.9 Displacement of adaptation primarily includes 
                                                                                                                                                           
Cities: Universal Patterns in Human Urban Mobility,” PLoS ONE 7, no. 5 (2012): e37027; Vinicius 
S. De Stefano et al., “Live Human Assessment of Depth-Dependent Corneal Displacements with 
Swept-Source Optical Coherence Elastography,” PLoS ONE 13, no. 12 (2019): e0209480. 
6 Asam Almohamed and Dhaval Vyas, “Vulnerability of Displacement: Challenges for Integrating 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Host Communities,” in Proceedings of the 28th Australian 
Computer-Human Interaction Conference, OzCHI 2016, 2016, 125–134. 
7 Chris McDowell, Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-Induced 
Displacement, vol. 2 (Berghahn books, 1996). 
8 W Courtland Robinson, Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of 
Development-Induced Displacement (The Brookings Institution-SAIS Project of Internal 
Displacement Washington DC, 2003). 
9 Akhteruz Zaman and Jahnnabi Das, “Injustice versus Insecurity Climate-Induced Displacement in 




voluntary migration, environmentally induced displacement, and development-induced 
displacement.10 As such, displacement can result from either natural or manmade causes, but 
manmade causes have been shown to be the most devastating because more conflict tends to result 
in more conflict, unlike natural sources that do not have such a feedback mechanism. Once 
displaced, the displaced persons usually face worse conditions wherever they go because they are 
either not welcome or are not adapted to dealing with the challenges associated with living in those 
places. As such, regardless of where people are displaced, the outcome of the displacement is 
almost always negative and has presented a humanitarian challenge that the world is still working 
to address. Of interest is the displacement that results from conflict and collapses of states, whereby 
millions of people are left stateless as they attempt to escape their countries of birth.11 The 
migration causes a strain on global resources, especially as other countries are expected to host the 
displaced people and offer them their resources. Understanding the causes of displacement in detail 
can provide insights on how the global community can introduce interventions before the 
displacement occurs and mitigate the negative outcomes once the displacement has resulted.  
Disaster-Induced Displacement  
Disasters threaten the lives of people and force them to leave their places of residence in 
search of places where the threats are nonexistent or are less threatening to the lives of people. In 
the context of human displacement, disasters are defined as any natural forces or events that have 
the potential to have catastrophic consequences. These consequences tend to include the loss of life 
and the destruction of property, with many places across being vulnerable to different types of 
                                                
10 Yang Wang et al., “Perceived Discrimination of Displaced People in Development-Induced 
Displacement and Resettlement: The Role of Integration,” Cities 101 (2020): 102692. 
11 Amy Maguire and Amy Elton, “Extending a Collective Human Right to Address a Global 
Challenge: Self-Determination for Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Stateless Persons,” Austl. Int’l LJ 
25 (2018): 227. 
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natural disasters depending on geological and climatic factors.12 Any event or natural force that can 
be classified as a natural disaster has the potential to cause disaster-induced displacement 
depending on its severity and its impact on human life. Some of the most catastrophic disasters 
include wildfires, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, heat waves, landslides, floods, earthquakes, 
avalanches, blizzards, and tropical cyclones.13 As people pollute the natural environment through 
the release of greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels, it is expected that climate change will 
result in far-reaching environmental changes. The environmental concern of climate change will 
result in human displacement once the melting of polar icecaps and the expansion of sea water 
results in the rise in sea levels.14 Since it is impossible to know the extent and how the sea level 
will rise, there is no way of knowing the number of people that will be displaced from their homes 
as a result of climate change. The known factor in the climate change equation is that at least 75% 
of the megacities in the world are located by the sea, which means millions and possibly billions of 
people will be affected directly and indirectly.15 Estimates indicate that at least 80% of the global 
human population lives at about 60 miles from the coast, which puts a considerable portion of the 
population at risk. Increasing global temperatures have also been shown to result in more powerful 
and catastrophic disasters related to changes in weather conditions.  
                                                
12 Téofilo Altamirano, “Climate Change, Vulnerability, Social Conflicts and Human Displacement in 
the Andes: The Case of Huaytapallana Glacier,” Ambiente, Comportamiento y Sociedad 3, no. 1 
(2020): 1–7. 
13 Sandeep Narayan Kundu, “Geohazard Modeling Using Remote Sensing and GIS,” in Modelling 
Trends in Solid and Hazardous Waste Management (Springer, 2017), 127–139. 
14 Mathew E. Hauer et al., “Sea-Level Rise and Human Migration,” Nature Reviews Earth & 
Environment 1, no. 1 (2020): 28–39. 
15 Johannes M. Luetz and John Merson, “Climate Change and Human Migration as Adaptation: 
Conceptual and Practical Challenges and Opportunities,” in Climate Action. Encyclopedia of the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (Vol. SDG 3-Climate Action, Earth and Environmental Science Ed., 




Natural disasters tend to result in human displacement on a smaller scale whereby 
displacements resulting from forest fires and floods even tend to be temporary until the disaster is 
over and people go back home. One natural disaster that resulted in considerable movement is the 
typhoon Haiyan that affected the Philippines in 2013, whereby it is the strongest storm to have 
been recorded once it hit landfall.16 Hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons generate their power from 
water that has warmer temperatures.  As climate change causes increases global temperatures, there 
have been increasing water temperatures as well, which has resulted in increasingly stronger storms 
across the world. The UN estimates that typhoon Haiyan resulted in the temporary or permanent 
displacement of more than 4.1 million people which indicates the importance of exploring natural 
disasters in the study of human displacement.17 The UN report also shows that weather-related 
consequences of climate and natural disasters resulted in the displacement of more than 22 million 
people, which made disaster-induced displacement the most prevalent for the year.  
Conflict Induced Displacement  
Human societies are not always peaceful, whereby people will always disagree with each 
other based on their differences in demographic factors, cultural factors, or political opinions.18 
When conflicts escalate, usually into violence, one or more groups of people are forced to leave the 
area they share in the search for another area in which there is no conflict. The conflicts can result 
in the movement of people even away from a country, especially in cases where the conflict results 
in so much death that people start fearing for their lives. Conflict-induced displacement is the 
                                                
16 Daniel Fitzpatrick and Caroline Compton, “Seeing Like a State: Land Law and Human Mobility 
after Super Typhoon Haiyan,” SSRN Electronic Journal 50 (2017). 
17 Maria Regina Hechanova et al., “Evaluation of a Resilience Intervention for Filipino Displaced 
Survivors of Super Typhoon Haiyan,” Disaster Prevention and Management: An International 
Journal 27, no. 3 (2018): 346–359. 
18 Joel Anderson and Rose Ferguson, “Demographic and Ideological Correlates of Negative 
Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Australian Journal of Psychology 70, 
no. 1 (2018): 18–29. 
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consequence of human interactions, whereby groups with conflicting perspectives of the world 
interacting can escalate into violence that may result in deaths.19 In an attempt to protect 
themselves and their loved ones from the ravages of war or civil war, groups of people migrate 
across the world to more peaceful places. The conflicts may not result in war and may include any 
forced migration as a result of persecution due to religion race and political views among other 
demographic differences. When conflicts are addressed, it is possible for people who have been 
displaced due to conflict to go back to their homes, but this is not usually the case because states 
that cause such migration tend to be states that lack a stable political system.20  
One of the most recent examples of conflict-induced displacement is the displacement that 
has resulted from the ongoing Syrian civil war, which has caused internally displaced persons and 
refugees.21 The United Nations estimates that at least three million refugees have resulted from the 
civil war, and at least seven million have been displaced internally.22 The combined displaced 
people from Syria account for more than 40% of the country’s prewar population.23 On a global 
scale, conflicts have displaced 16.7 million refugees, 1.2 million asylum seekers, and 33.3 million 
                                                
19 Eran Bendavid et al., “The Effects of Armed Conflict on the Health of Women and Children,” The 
Lancet 397, no. 10273 (2021): 522–532. 
20 Sumaira Akbarzada and Tim K. Mackey, “The Syrian Public Health and Humanitarian Crisis: A 
‘Displacement’ in Global Governance?,” Global Public Health 13, no. 7 (2018): 914–930. 
21 Xi Li et al., “Intercalibration between DMSP/OLS and VIIRS Night-Time Light Images to 
Evaluate City Light Dynamics of Syria’s Major Human Settlement during Syrian Civil War,” 
International Journal of Remote Sensing 38, no. 21 (2017): 5934–5951. 
22 Xu Zhang and Catherine A Luther, “Transnational News Media Coverage of Distant Suffering in 
the Syrian Civil War: An Analysis of CNN, Al-Jazeera English and Sputnik Online News,” Media, 
War & Conflict 13, no. 4 (2020): 399–424. 
23 Samuel Berhanu Woldemariam, Amy Maguire, and Jason von Meding, “Forced Human 
Displacement, the Third World and International Law: A Twail Perspective,” Melbourne Journal of 





internally displaced people for a total of more than 51.2 million.24 The widespread human 
displacement from regions and countries across the world has given rise to a humanitarian issue of 
great concern, which has forced the world to rethink its approach to the issue.25 The large number 
of displaced people has even resulted in some nations limiting the number of refugees and asylum 
seekers they admit into their boundaries, as human displacement has put more pressure on the 
resources in the countries with better political, social, and economic stability. 
                                                
24 Alma Smajlovic and April L. Murphy, “Invisible No More: Social Work, Human Rights, and the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Journal of Human Rights and Social Work 5, no. 2 (2020): 139–144. 
25 Bogumil Terminski, “Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Theoretical 
Frameworks and Current Challenges,” Development 10 (2013): 101; Jeff Crisp, Tim Morris, and 
Hilde Refstie, “Displacement in Urban Areas: New Challenges, New Partnerships,” Disasters 36, no. 




Chapter 2: Disintegration of the State and its Loss of Control Over Society  
International law defines the state as an entity with a defined territory, under the control of 
its government, with a permanent population, and engages in formal interactions and relations with 
similar entities.26 As such, the state is responsible for protecting the interests of the people within 
its territory by eliminating or mitigating any internal or external factors that will threaten stability. 
In many of the countries in which there is considerable human displacement, the primary cause is 
that the effective control of the government fades or is disrupted to an extent that the state no 
longer experiences stability and security. Coups and rebellions are usually an extension of further 
underlying issues that threaten the ability of the government to maintain control of its territory. The 
disintegration of state structures is usually characterized by the implosion of national authority, 
institutions, law, and order, such that the whole body politic ends up collapsing.27 In addition, since 
people need their government to hold a certain degree of legitimacy in order to maintain its 
statehood, the disintegration of the state structure implies a breakdown of the values on which the 
state bases its legitimacy. Once the state loses its legitimacy, citizens are forced to withdraw into a 
form of nationalism based on ethnic or religious affiliation that ends up becoming their residual and 
viable form of identity.28 In many cases, when the state structures collapse, it falls onto various 
factions to maintain law and order, as well as exerting other forms of authority. While the state 
itself will not disappear, it will lose the e capacity to engage in normal government functions.  
                                                
26 Alison K Eggers, “When Is a State a State-The Case for Recognition of Somaliland,” BC Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 30 (2007): 211. 
27 D. Elwood Dunn and I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority, International Journal, vol. 51 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). 
28 Roger Petersen, “Identity, Rationality, and Emotion in the Processes of State Disintegration and 




Levels of State Disintegration  
The disintegration of the state varies in terms of intensity, and the effects may be felt 
differently in different parts of the country depending on the overall makeup of the population and 
its government. At the lowest levels of state disintegration, governments remain in office, but their 
control of the territory and the population is limited considerably.29 In higher levels of state 
disintegration, some crucial structures may remain functional such that the state is represented in 
the international community, but is comprised of multiple warring factions. In the higher extreme, 
the government no longer holds uncontested power and the ability to use force, such that anyone 
with the resources to hire an armed force will do so at will. The regular armed forces that are 
controlled by the government usually remain functional, but they too end up breaking down over 
time due to lack of absolute control. Even more concerning is the tendency for private armies and 
security departments to emerge and proliferate, and instead of offering security like regular armed 
forces, they tend to be parts of profit-oriented conglomerates that are outside state control.30 The 
process of shifting from low state disintegration to higher state disintegration tends to follow a 
format in which the government gradually loses its ability to maintain law and order. Over time, 
the dysfunctional government will end up resulting in a failed state that can hardly ensure the 
wellbeing of the people within their territories, hence the tendency for human displacement.31 As 
the state is supposed to ensure that the rights and interests of the people are protected, if this fails 
then people may be forced to move in order to protect their own lives or in search of better 
opportunities.  
                                                
29 Brigitta Malagurski et al., “Topological Disintegration of Resting State Functional Connectomes 
in Coma,” NeuroImage 195 (2019): 354–361. 
30 Farideh Farhi, “State Disintegration and Urban-Based Revolutionary Crisis: A Comparative 
Analysis of Iran and Nicaragua,” Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 2 (1988): 231–256. 
31 Teo Ballvé, “Everyday State Formation: Territory, Decentralization, and the Narco Landgrab in 
Colombia,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 30, no. 4 (2012): 603–622. 
 
 11 
Many of the most dysfunctional states are still recognized as part of the international 
community and are even represented in organizations like the United Nations.32 Some of the main 
predictors of total disintegration, many of which start even in the early stages, include chaos and 
crime, whereby the government starts losing its ability to prevent members of the population from 
committing crimes.33 Governments that are facing near breakdown of state structures tend to lash 
out against the people, as evident in how some governments may use excessive force to quell riots 
and protests. When the people question the injustices of the government, they can be thrown in jail 
or receive threats to their lives, and displacement due to persecution can start happening even in 
these early stages. If a government feels that its legitimacy is being threatened by the words or 
actions of its people, it will do anything to protect itself. Some of the actions by these governments 
can even result in the death of people before they start leaving the country in search of places 
where their safety can be assured. While chaos and crime may result in the displacement of a few 
people at first, when the state structures collapse completely, then people are displaced en masse.34 
The state even loses the characteristic of being a state, as there are even no longer representatives 
of the people with whom the global community or humanitarian organizations can interact.  
Yemen and Syria  
Yemen  
Yemen has been in crisis since 2015, causing this country in the south of the Arabian 
Peninsula to endure one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. More than four million people of 
Yemen have been displaced from their homes while more than 20 million are facing the dire need 
                                                
32 Markus Patberg, “Can Disintegration Be Democratic? The European Union Between Legitimate 
Change and Regression,” Political Studies 68, no. 3 (2020): 582–599. 
33 Michael J Mazarr, “The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm Requiem for a Decade of 
Distraction,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (2014): 0–1. 
34 Glenn M. Schwartz, “From Collapse to Regeneration,” After Collapse: The Regeneration of 
Complex Societies 9780816521 (2010): 3–17. 
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of humanitarian assistance.35 While Yemen was already one of the poorest Middle Eastern 
countries, the conditions in the country continued deteriorating after the breakout of violence in 
March 2015. The violence has disrupted Yemeni society such that more than half of the country’s 
health facilities have either been destroyed or shuttered.36 Institutional collapse and economic drain 
that has been happening over the years have pushed Yemen to the brink of large-scale starvation 
for many members of its population.37 Currently, more than half a million people in Yemen are 
living in famine-like conditions, and at the start of 2021, about 16 million more people are facing a 
considerable risk of going hungry within the year.38 The people of Yemen have become a burden 
for the rest of the world, especially as the violence has resulted in their internal and external 
displacement.39 As long as they have been displaced from their homes, the people of Yemen have 
been suffering and need humanitarian aid from the rest of the world, a situation that has been 
worsened by the poor economic and climate conditions in the country.  
Although most people in Yemen are at risk of starvation and the associated suffering, at 
most risk are the people of Yemen who have been displaced from their homes as a result of the 
violence. About 67% of the displaced Yemenis, which includes 2.6 million people, are food 
insecure, and research indicates that their risk of falling into hunger is at least four times as much 
as other members of the Yemeni population. The COVID-19 pandemic has made the situation of 
                                                
35 Mara A Leichtman, “Humanitarian Aid in Yemen Through the Eyes of a Kuwaiti Role Model for 
Women,” Journal of Muslim Philanthropy & Civil Society 4, no. 2 (2020): 89–114. 
36 Mohammed M. Alassar et al., “Severe Dehydration among Cholera Patients in Yemen: A Cohort 
Profile,” Germs 10, no. 4 (2020): 338–345; Jeannie Sowers and Erika Weinthal, “Humanitarian 
Challenges and the Targeting of Civilian Infrastructure in the Yemen War,” International Affairs 97, 
no. 1 (2021): 157–177. 
37 Carlisle Ford Runge and Linnea Graham, “Hunger as a Weapon of War: Hitler’s Hunger Plan, 
Native American Resettlement and Starvation in Yemen,” Food Policy 92 (2020): 101835. 
38 Laura Graham, “Prosecuting Starvation Crimes in Yemen ’ s Civil War,” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 
52, no. 1 (2020): 267. 
39 David James Cantor and Jacob Ochieng Apollo, “Internal Displacement, Internal Migration, and 
Refugee Flows: Connecting the Dots,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2020): 647–664. 
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the displaced Yemenis at even greater risk due to deteriorating economic and healthcare 
conditions.40 Some of the preventable diseases for which the people of Yemen have been suffering 
include diphtheria, dengue fever, cholera, and measles.41 The healthcare situation is worsened by 
the fact that about half of the country’s healthcare institutions are nonfunctional, and people cannot 
even be treated for common ailments. Although Yemen is suffering from a six-year-long conflict, 
the country still plays host to at least 135,000 asylum seekers and refugees from Ethiopia and 
Somalia.42 As a consequence, Yemen is the largest host for Somali refugees in the world, which 
means that the country still attempts to do the right thing for displaced people despite its own 
challenges.43 The global community should therefore step up its efforts of supporting Yemen in its 
human displacement and humanitarian challenges, including attempting to address the course of the 
conflict.  
The UNHCR has been working with other similar organizations to send aid to Yemenis 
who have fallen victim to the country’s six-year-long civil war that has resulted in the displacement 
of millions.44 The civil war as well as the displacement of locals have made it difficult to 
impossible for relief efforts to reach the people, but despite the challenges, the UNHCR is still 
                                                
40 Abdulsamad Taresh Abdullah et al., “COVID-19 Pandemic in the Midst of Civil War: Planetary 
Health and Plant Omics Field Notes from Aden, Yemen,” OMICS mA Journal of Integrative Biology 
24, no. 12 (2020): 685–687. 
41 Paul Eze et al., “Morbidities & Outcomes of a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit in a Complex 
Humanitarian Conflict Setting, Hajjah Yemen: 2017-2018,” Conflict and Health 14, no. 1 (2020): 1–
10; Alassar et al., “Severe Dehydration among Cholera Patients in Yemen: A Cohort Profile.” 
42 Jera Lego, “Criminalized and Vulnerable: Refugees And Asylum Seekers in Thailand and 
Malaysia,” in Agency and Immigration Policy (Transnational Press London, 2020), 7–28. 
43 Alex de Waal, “The Horn of Africa and the Yemen Crisis,” in Global, Regional, and Local 
Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis (Springer, 2020), 195–208; Brendon J. Cannon and Federico Donelli, 
“Asymmetric Alliances and High Polarity: Evaluating Regional Security Complexes in the Middle 
East and Horn of Africa,” Third World Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2020): 505–524. 
44 Hameed Alqatabry and Charity Butcher, “Humanitarian Aid in Yemen: Collaboration or Co-
Optation?,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 15, no. 2 (2020): 250–255. 
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doing something to provide humanitarian aid.45 The priorities of the global community in its 
support of the people of Yemen are based on the idea of Yemen being a disintegrated state.46 Since 
the state has been unable to provide the people with security, they need to remain safe in their 
homes, people have had to leave their homes, and depend on the international community for 
protection. In addition to the provision of protection to displaced Yemenis, the global community 
also provides millions of Yemenis with a sense of food security due to the risk of starvation they 
face.47 In an attempt at enabling displaced families to meet their basic needs since the government 
has failed to do so, the UNHCR provides them with shelter, cash assistance, legal aid, essential 
household supplies, and registration services.48 Through the cash assistance program, the UNHCR 
has been able to reach at least a million people every year over the years. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has strained the UNHCR resources even further as it has had to support healthcare facilities by 
distributing hygiene kits as well as supporting activities for raising awareness about the pandemic.  
Syria  
Like the human displacement in Yemen, the human displacement in Syria is the result of 
civil war and has caused considerable degrees of displacement that are comparable to those that 
have been experienced in Yemen. Another similarity between the two countries is that the civil war 
in Syria is also the consequence of political disagreements, with the state having failed to hold on 
                                                
45 Sowers and Weinthal, “Humanitarian Challenges and the Targeting of Civilian Infrastructure in 
the Yemen War.” 
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to its legitimacy, power, and unity.49 In both cases, different political factions believe they have the 
right to power in the country and managed to set the people of the country against each other, 
hence the bloody civil wars.50 For both Syria and Yemen, the warring political factions have 
managed to gain both local and foreign supporters to their cause, which has served to not only 
prolong the civil wars but also to make them more deadly to all participants.51 Since many people 
just want to live their day-to-day lives in peace, the political conflict only serves to push them out 
of their homes if they can hope to protect themselves and their loved ones from being killed in the 
process. However, unlike the Yemeni government that failed to protect its military camp from 
militants, the Syrian civil war started when the government started using violence in the 
suppression of demonstrations.52 In Syria, the extensive use of military, police, and paramilitary 
forces resulted in the formation of opposition militias, and the conflict escalated to a full-fledged 
civil war.  
Regardless of the differences in how the civil wars originated, both were a manifestation of 
a disintegrating state in which the government was losing the ability to protect themselves and the 
people. Governments that lash out against their people or allow militias to mete out violence 
against their people are failing governments that are losing their legitimacy and hold on power.53 
The outcomes of the Syrian civil war, which officially started in March 2011, are similar to the 
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outcomes of the Yemeni civil war, especially in regard to human displacement.54 In addition to the 
many deaths resulting from the civil war, the Syrian civil war has also torn the country apart and 
resulted in the deterioration of standards of living for Syrians by decades.55 Since the Syrian civil 
war has lasted for a decade, it is more renowned than the civil war in Yemen, and it has resulted in 
the largest displacement and refugee crisis in recent human history. Like the displaced Yemenis, 
displaced Syrians have ended up becoming a considerable burden for the rest of the world, 
whereby many countries have had to take in large numbers of Syrian refugees.56 The resources of 
many countries have even been strained so much that they no longer want to admit refugees from 
Syria to protect the welfare of their own people.  
The human displacement of the people of Syria is a combination of both internal 
displacement and external displacement, with each group presenting unique challenges for Syria 
and the rest of the world. Internally displaced Syrians include about 6.2 million people who left 
their homes running away from the conflict and violence that have characterized Syria since 
2011.57 In addition to the 6.2 million internally displaced Syrians, about 5.6 million people of 
Syrian origin can be found in countries across the world.58 The refugees from Syria are those 
people who opted to leave the country as a result of their displacement instead of just changing 
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their location within Syria. The Syrian refugees have ended up becoming such a burden to the 
global community that many nations have even considered limiting the number of Syrian 
employees they should accept.59 Together, both the internally displaced Syrians and the Syrian 
refugees make up about 12 million people who are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The 
displacement situation in Syria is made even more severe because more than half of those that are 
negatively affected by the refugee crisis are young children who cannot even earn a living given 
the opportunity.  
Similar to the situation in Yemen, the conflict in Syria has resulted in the destruction of 
public amenities, which were not adequately funded, resulting in even more far-reaching 
challenges. As a result of the violence accompanying the Syrian civil war, public amenities like 
sanitation systems, water, utilities, schools, hospitals, and health centers were either destroyed or 
damaged. The people displacement that resulted in Syria can be attributed to the fact that the 
violence that the people faced broke their business and social ties such that they had no option but 
to abandon their own homes. The level of state breakdown and dysfunction in Syria takes a 
different path from that of Yemen in which the conflict is primarily political. In Syria, while there 
is a political element in the conflict and the resulting human displacement, the civil war has 
devolved into a sectarian conflict that has divided the country along religious lines. With the 
religious groups in Syria in opposition with each other, they have ended up affecting the whole of 
the Middle East, such that fighting has even overflowed for other countries. In addition, unlike 
Yemen in which external interference is limited, the Syrian conflict suffers from heavy influence 
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Chapter 3: Growing Autocracy  
While the political dysfunction in the Middle East comes primarily from different political 
factions wanting to take power for themselves, the situation in Latin America is different.60 The 
main cause of strife in Latin America is the inability of governments to protect their people from 
crime, whereby organized crime has taken root in most South American nations.61 Organized crime 
controls a considerable portion of the lives of south Americans, such that many hardly ever know a 
life in which their day-to-day lives are not controlled by criminals. Even if the governments are 
working towards making improvements and enabling the people to advance economically and 
personally, a history of abuse by the governments has resulted in people losing trust in their 
governments.62 Criminals have such a strong hold on the economic and political systems in these 
nations that the people of South America have all but given up on the ability of governments to 
protect them. Members of organized crime syndicates have infiltrated the Latin American 
governments such that it is nearly impossible to find a government that has yet to be infiltrated by 
criminal organizations.63 Lack of trust in governments coupled with the inability of governments to 
protect the people from crime has forced many Latin Americans to engage in protests against their 
governments.64 These protests are aimed at getting the attention of the governments and 
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encouraging them to change for the wellbeing of their people, even if achieving any change has 
proven to be difficult.  
In Latin American nations, one regime is usually substituted for a worse one, as indicated 
by the Mexican revolution in which different leaders used a wide range of tactics to gain control of 
the country.65 Currently, people are engaging in antigovernment protests that can be sustained for 
months and may turn violent resulting in the deaths of people.66 Many Latin Americans have been 
displaced and forced into exile by the protests and other violent activities, as the governments use 
force and other forms of manipulation to remain in power. As violence and crime have disrupted 
the day-to-day lives of the people in Latin America, many people have started supporting 
authoritarianism.67 While Latin American nations have been undergoing changes to incorporate 
democratic tendencies in their political systems, the situation seems to be getting worse. Instead of 
having democratic systems that lack the institution and structure they need to maintain order, 
people have been shifting in their political beliefs, and many hold that it is better to have an 
authoritarian system of government instead of a dysfunctional democracy.68 The governments have 
been unable to maintain control of the state, such that the people are usually left to fend for 
themselves in villages and towns that are under the control of criminals and criminal organizations. 
The demonstrations have been observed in countries like Chile, Paraguay, Colombia, Peru, 
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Ecuador, and Bolivia, and have different impacts and origins.69 Despite the varying causes of 
protests and increasing support for autocracy, the violence and resulting displacement in Latin 
American nations like Honduras and Venezuela have much in common.  
As young democracies, South American nations are characterized by high rates of election 
fraud and election violence, such that in many cases there is usually no clear winner in elections. In 
addition, as insecurity and crime makes the country challenging for any person to travel, the cost of 
transport in the countries has been increasing continuously.70 With the inability of governments to 
keep the cost of transport in check, the people have become even more aggravated, and the 
frequency, length, and intensity of their protests have increased considerably.71 These protests have 
ended up making countries that were already unsafe and difficult to live in even more challenging 
to locals, with many opting to leave their homes or even the countries altogether. The protests and 
the accompanying increases in the cost of living are an indicator of the people of South America 
expressing their frustration with the status quo of the politics in their countries.72 In addition, 
demonstrations are a protest against the rampant poverty, corruption, and economic inequality that 
characterizes many of the countries in Latin America without governments taking any action to 
address them. The mass protests in South America are an indicator that many people across Latin 
America are tired of the state of their nations, and some believe that the mass protests are a positive 
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turn of life in Latin America.73 The challenge to the status quo is mainly being driven by leftists 
and young people who are informed enough to want their nations to experience positive change.  
The protests in South America have been highly polarizing, as many people do not know 
how their countries will turn out if the political systems change, as the democratization has not 
turned out well for Latin American countries and their people. The people in South American 
countries hold different views of the protests, with some countries like Chile having almost 
universal support while some countries like Columbia have less support due to their conservative 
nature.74 Human displacement in modern Latin America has primarily resulted from the protests 
and the associated crime, with the disruption of day-to-day lives and the turning of towns into 
conflict zones forcing many to leave their homes. The displacement has also become exacerbated 
by increasing levels of resentment among the people, as the governments have been unable to 
address the protests and unite people towards achieving mutually beneficial progress. There have 
also been widespread concerns that Latin American countries have been experiencing the 
unraveling of social order, such that many have been forcefully displaced because they cannot be 
protected by the government and its representatives.75 These perceptions have been driving more 
and more south Americans to believe that an autocratic approach to the government may be the 
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solution to the challenges they are facing.76 As democratic governments usually allow for a 
considerable degree of freedom, they are even more prone to corruption than autocracies, hence the 
reason they have been failing to maintain law and order in the countries.  
As protests increase, more people are losing faith in their governments, as the protests have 
been exacerbating already challenging living conditions for people in many Latin American 
countries. While the intention of the protests is to bring social and political changes peacefully, 
they tend to escalate into violence and remind the people of South America about the times they 
have had to live their lives in the face of persecution by criminal organizations and political 
bodies.77 The protests have forced people to remember a time when, while life was not perfect, 
there was no power vacuum because autocrats tend to exert absolute control over most elements of 
the lives of the people. While young people and leftists support the protests because they want to 
change, many people just want to live their day-to-day lives with minimal to no disruptions that 
may end up with them being displaced from their homes. Many people across Latin American 
nations believe that the countries need strong autocratic leaders, even if the leader need not have 
been elected by the people.78 The number of people who support autocratic leadership has been 
increasing as the countries become more unstable, which is an indicator that democracy may not be 
the best solution for all countries. Even in the Middle East, the Arab Spring did not necessarily 
result in more stability, as more and more people are still experiencing violence and displacement, 
                                                
76 Javier Corrales, “Authoritarian Survival: Why Maduro Hasn’t Fallen,” Journal of Democracy 31, 
no. 3 (2020): 39–53; Sebastian Hellmeier and Nils B. Weidmann, “Pulling the Strings? The Strategic 
Use of Pro-Government Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes,” Comparative Political Studies 53, 
no. 1 (2020): 71–108. 
77 Doran, “The Hidden Face of Violence in Latin America: Assessing the Criminalization of Protest 
in Comparative Perspective.” 
78 Elisabet Dueholm Rasch, “Citizens, Criminalization and Violence in Natural Resource Conflicts in 
Latin America,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 103 (2017): 131–
142; Daniel Lvovich, “Authoritarianism, Nationalism, Fascism and National Security Doctrine: The 
Debate on Latin American Southern Cone Dictatorships,” in Reactionary Nationalists, Fascists and 
Dictatorships in the Twentieth Century (Springer, 2019), 327–344. 
 
 24 
sometimes worse than when the countries were under authoritarian rule.79 While the global 
community discusses whether all nations need democracy, it is the locals in the different countries 
who pay the price either through violence or displacement during the transition period.  
Expectations of long-term political change in the countries as a result of the protests is a 
positive outlook for nations that have been experiencing instability for years, especially as they 
transitioned to become democracies.80 Since the protests have been happening under the watch of 
democratically elected governments, many people have lost faith in their governments, as these 
regimes do not seem to have a solution to the challenges they are facing.81 Instead, many people 
have been left to fend for themselves as they watch their countries become even more violent with 
no respite in sight. South Americans who are opposed to the protests are also more likely than other 
South Americans to support the idea of presidents dissolving Congress and leading the country 
without a legislature.82 Leading without a legislature is referred to as an executive coup, and many 
believe that such an approach to leadership is an excellent strategy for leading Latin American 
countries at times when they are facing far-reaching difficulties. The increasing tolerance for an 
authoritarian approach to governance is an indicator that the people do not think their current 
governments are capable of keeping violence and crime in check.83 If a government cannot either 
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forcefully stop protests or address the grievances of protestors, then it can be assumed to have 
failed, and the only way forward would be to change the form of government.84 For Latin 
American nations that have had a complicated relationship with democracy over the years, the only 
logical alternative to democracy is an autocracy, with autocratic leaders being seen as the only 
solution to the failings of democratic governance.  
In Latin America, many of the countries in the region have historically been dictatorships, 
with many having experienced some changes, but even the introduction of elections did not stop 
them from being autocratic.85 When a nation has been a military dictatorship for most of its recent 
history, then attempts at introducing a democratic approach to governance will be overrun by 
authoritarian tendencies.86 Most of the countries in Latin America started transitioning from being 
military dictatorships to becoming democracies in the 1980s, a process that is still underway. 
However, as the inefficiencies and shortcomings of a democratic approach become more apparent 
to more people, there has been declining support for democracies in Latin America starting 2010.87 
Currently, less than half the people in Latin America hold the belief that the best approach to 
governance is democracy. The political context in Latin America has caused the people to believe 
that only through autocratic leadership is it possible for crime and violence to be addressed 
adequately. As indicated by the progress made in developed countries, representational governance 
is the first step in achieving sufficient political and social stability that should result in better 
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economic performance.88 However, introducing democracy in places where all people have known 
is violence and dictatorship tends to leave a feeling of a power vacuum. The power vacuum that 
results from democratization ends up resulting in the proliferation of crime and violence, which is 
exactly what is happening in recently democratized nations like Nigeria, Egypt, and Libya among 
many others.  
The people in Latin America are most likely supporting authoritarian leadership because of 
the poor relationship that the region is having with democracy, as well as the possible manipulation 
that is being done by dictatorships. Dictatorships in 21st century Latin America are increasingly 
using democracy as a tool to legitimize authority, consolidate power, and repress their citizens. 
This piece considers the recent examples of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Honduras. 89 21st-century 
dictatorships in Latin America are increasingly ‘democratic’. In their various forms and stages, 
these carefully engineered and gradually implemented regimes do not reject but are using 
democracy as the most effective way to legitimize their authority and justify their brutal 
repression.90 Unlike the military dictatorships that rejected democracy across the region during the 
20th century (e.g., Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Reynaldo Bignone in Argentina, Fidel Castro in 
Cuba, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, Castelo Branco in 
Brazil, Luis García Meza in Bolivia, Maximiliano Hernández in El Salvador, or Rafael Trujillo in 
the Dominican Republic), modern dictatorships in Latin America use democracy not only to attain 
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but also eventually to retain power and, in the process, legitimize their political authority.91 This 
phenomenon can be referred to as “democratic blending”: a masked transformation of democratic 
institutions, principles, and the rule of law that allows elected yet steadily authoritarian 
governments to benefit from the appearance of democracy while constructing the rules of a 
dictatorship.   
Governments that successfully push forward this portrayal of democracy often seize the 
institutional (security forces, branches of government) and non-institutional (media, opposition) 
structures of power that either limit, supervise, or counterbalance their authority.92 Rather than 
promoting the will of the people or a social agreement on the distribution of power, democracy in 
this context becomes the perfect masquerade with which to advance the dictator’s will and prevent 
the distribution of power.93 This phenomenon can be referred to as “democratic delusion”: an 
illusory sense of constitutional authority designed to develop disguised dictatorships. Once it 
blends, democracy is no longer a system of government but a tool of maintaining power for a 
repressive regime. This piece will discuss three recent examples of these phenomenon in Latin 
America: Nicaragua, Honduras, and Venezuela. The case of Nicaragua is revealing. Since the 
democratic election of Daniel Ortega as President of Nicaragua in 2006, Ortega and his wife, Vice-
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President Rosario Murillo, have created one of the most autocratic regimes in the region.94 After 
getting control of the National Assembly (by winning 71 out of 92 seats), the Supreme Court (by 
appointing 11 out of 16 justices), and the Supreme Electoral Council, Ortega’s government 
successfully promoted a constitutional reform process, enabling him to run for three consecutive 
terms while reducing the number of votes required to be elected.   
At present, opposition in Nicaragua is non-existent. And the only remaining independent 
force, the students’ movement, has faced a violent crack-down by security forces and paramilitary 
groups all over the country, which in recent weeks has resulted in more than 81 people being killed, 
838 injured, and 438 arrested.95 The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Geneva has called these deaths “unlawful killings” while the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights has insisted on the need of conducting an on-site investigation notwithstanding the 
government of Nicaragua's rejection.96 Another critical case of the phenomenon discussed earlier is 
Honduras. Using the power of constitutional appointments, President Juan Orlando Hernández 
gradually seized control of the Supreme Court of Honduras, which was the only way for him to 
circumvent the constitutional prohibition on presidential re-election established by Articles 42.5 
and 239 of the Honduras Constitution of 1982 in conjunction with Article 330 of the Penal Code, 
the latter of which criminalizes any attempt to modify the Constitution to that end.97  However, 
thanks to a Supreme Court decision that declared inapplicable such provisions and authorized the 
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indefinite presidential re-election in Honduras, President Hernández did run for a second term, 
winning the 2017 presidential election.  
Hernández’s government has been accused of electoral fraud, systematic corruption, and 
human rights violations.98 Yet both political and criminal investigations against his government 
have been diluted through acts of Congress—another institution Hernández’s government now 
controls. Worst yet, just as President Ortega has done it in Nicaragua, President Hernández is using 
state security forces to repress any protest in Honduras.99 The face of an authoritarian regime in 
Honduras is finally emerging. Among all cases of democratic blending in Latin America, 
Venezuela represents the most endemic one. Following the democratic election of Nicolás Maduro 
as President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2013, Maduro gained institutional control 
of the state by using the powers granted by Venezuela’s Constitution of 1999.100 After securing the 
loyalty of all Supreme Court justices through strategic constitutional appointments, President 
Maduro won the sympathy of the military, security forces, and public officials by increasing their 
salaries in the midst of the country’s worst economic crisis.101 Furthermore, Maduro’s government 
has ordered the detention of more than 1,300 political prisoners while the ANC has passed laws 
precluding political parties that did not participate in the 2017 municipal elections—that is, nearly 
all opposition parties—from participating in the 2018 presidential election; a political and 
authoritarian move that ended with Nicolás Maduro’s re-election.     
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Maduro’s regime has also muzzled the media through the use, misuse, and abuse of the rule 
of law. His government has expelled several foreign correspondents, detained at least 66 
journalists, and closed 69 media outlets across the country.102  Additionally, the Constituent 
National Assembly recently approved a law authorizing the criminal prosecution of individuals and 
media outlets for posting or broadcasting messages that either “encourage” or “incite” hate, 
violence, or public disturbance.103 The trend of Latin American autocratic and authoritarian 
governments using democracy as a tool in the process of creating dictatorships exposes critical 
flaws of democracy as a system of government.104 The replication of these regimes reveals not only 
the personal ambition or abuse of power of the leaders discussed here, but also the eventual 
dissembling of democratic values (freedom of expression), principles (separation of powers), and 
institutions (free vote) that once inspired, and are synonymous with the notion of democracy.105 
While the causes of displacement in Honduras and Venezuela are similar in a wide range of ways, 
the section below explores the differences by discussing the human displacement in both Latin 
American countries.  
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Honduras and Venezuela  
Honduras  
In Latin America, human displacement is closely linked to failure in the governments in the 
region to address the organized crime and violence problems faced by citizens. In Honduras, 
human displacement takes a combination of both internal displacement and external displacement 
depending on the real and perceived severity of the threat being faced by a citizen.106 For many 
residents of Honduras, the first step in the fleeing process is leaving one’s home in search of a 
sense of safety within the country, with the first step being to move away from places in which 
there are high incidences of violence and crime. The internal displacement acts as the precursor to 
international migration and is the starting point for a life of trauma and fear that is devoid of any 
protection by the government.107 One of the main reasons being internally displaced in Honduras is 
challenging is because the government does not have the tools it needs to reverse the process and 
introduce protections for the people. While the countries in the Middle East are in denial about the 
challenge of human displacement, the Honduran government started working with the UNHCR in 
2013 to explore the issue and determine the best way forward.108 The investigation revealed that by 
2015, at least 174,000 people had been internally displaced across 20 municipalities between 2004 
and 2014, and that the situation was getting worse.  
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Despite the government accepting that human displacement is a challenge that needs to be 
addressed, it has not done any further comprehensive research like the 2015 study. For instance, 
there was an approximately 22 percent increase in registered cases of people who have been 
forcefully displaced or at risk of displacement in 2017 compared to 2016. Based on the 
information, the main reason for the displacement is that there has been increasing violence that 
has resulted in the death of family members and friends.109 Recruitment by gangs, death threats, 
and extortions are also key factors resulting in the displacement of people in Honduras, as are 
sexual violence, kidnapping, forced disappearance, and intrafamilial violence.110 In addition to the 
acts of violence themselves, Hondurans are displaced by fear of repercussions from the perpetrators 
of violence. Violence in Honduras is evidence that the government of the Latin American nation is 
failing to address the organized crime problem in the nation.111 As such, even in cases where a 
person witnessed violence, homicide, or displacement, there is no way to report it to the 
government for fear of repercussions from the criminals.  
The experiences of violence and displacement by Hondurans have been characterized by 
fear of organized crime as well as the reluctance of the people to work with the government in 
identifying the criminals. Even humanitarian organizations have a hard time getting people who 
have been displaced to identify the perpetrators, which means that the Honduran society is 
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characterized by high levels of impunity.112 The high impunity rates are evidenced by the fact that 
only a mere 4% of all homicides result in convictions, which explains why people would rather 
leave their homes than attempt to get help from their government.113 It, therefore, makes sense that 
people who have been forcefully displaced are afraid of reporting their aggressors because there is 
a widespread tendency to be persecuted or receive retribution for making a formal or informal 
report. The tendency to leave one’s home rather than fight back is also a testament to a country that 
is in the control of organized crime and gangs in the form of territorial control over some parts of 
Honduras. To date, gangs like Mara Salvatrucha and Pandilla 18 continue to be major players in 
the internal displacement of the people of Honduras, but gangs are still not the main cause of 
displacement.114 According to research done on displaced people, the major causes of displacement 
are the police and organized crime, such that locals have a hard time telling which of the two is the 
negative element in their society. The impunity of the police and organized crime is worsened by 
the fact that both tend to have political influence in the country as they have representatives in 
regional and national governments.  
The country has been making efforts at addressing the violence and crime situation in 
Honduras, especially in the form of getting gangs in urban areas to lose their territorial control. The 
mano dura strategies aimed at addressing gang violence through the operaciones de saturación 
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have been shown to contribute to the displacement of even more Hondurans.115 The aggressive and 
targeted raids by anti-gang units result in more human displacement since driving gang members 
from one place to another will result in them displacing even more people. As the gangs leave 
urban areas, they take their activities to rural areas where they introduce both violence and 
instability, hence making internal displacement a national phenomenon.116 The overall causes of 
human displacement in Honduras include Mara Salvatrucha, Pandilla 18, gangs, criminal groups, 
common delinquents, and the police.117 In addition to these causes of human displacement, 
research indicates that even the government contributes to some displacement during large-scale 
development projects, but this is a minor issue in Honduras. The impact of displacement in 
Honduras has yet to be explored in detail, but the main outcome is that it leaves people of all 
genders and ages vulnerable in all elements of their lives.118 Although the tendency is to assume 
that displacement is an immediate problem that needs to be addressed, in places like Honduras, 
Venezuela, Yemen, and Syria, it is a symptom of larger elements of societal dysfunction. Often, the 
displacement is the last straw reaction to a series of multiple incidents, threats, and events that 
either expose a person and his or her family to violence or threaten one with violence in the long-
term.  
People will wait until violence or the threat of violence becomes intolerable, after which 
they will leave their homes without notice and never come back to their homes in the long-term. 
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Leaving without notice or planning makes it even harder to survive because displaced persons will 
not carry anything with them, such that they do not have even the basic supplies they need for their 
own survival during the time they are on the run.119 As such, when addressing the needs and 
interests of displaced persons, the best approach, as indicated by the UNHCR strategy, is to supply 
the displaced persons with basic needs like food, clothing, and shelter.120 By working with 
internally displaced persons, it is possible to come up with a strategy for encouraging them to work 
with authorities in stamping out criminal gangs and organized crime from the country.121 However, 
before involving them in making the country better, Honduras needs to consider that its displaced 
persons have other needs like the need for identification documents and the need for food.122 In 
addition, the government will need to protect the property of displaced persons because they are 
usually forced to sell their property cheaply, such that they end up with little to nothing to call their 
own.123 The displaced persons even abandon their houses, which are often taken over by the gangs 
so that they can have strategic control and use them for the illicit activities that displaced the 
owners in the first place.  
In Honduras, people who face the risk of being displaced tend to run to their family and 
friends in other towns as a first resort, which introduces more challenges to relatives who are 
already facing limited resources.124 The pressure on relatives and their families ends up forcing 
families into cycles of violence, poverty, and displacement, which means that the problems facing 
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the people of Honduras end up becoming worse over time.125 The displacement also means that 
most of the people who are affected end up losing their livelihood and facing substantially 
diminished earnings such that they can hardly meet their own basic needs. In many cases, internally 
displaced persons end up engaging in informal activities like temporary work or begging, such that 
they start relying on remittances from their relatives or their savings if any.126 Displacement can 
also result if a person is targeted by a gang for the purpose of either extortion or other activities that 
may force the person to leave his or her place of work, like a shop owner or street vendor.127 Once 
a person has been displaced in Honduras, this means that one will have to live with uncertainty, 
trauma, and hiding, with the intensity of these effects being heightened in children, youth, 
LGBTQ+ persons, and women.128 The women end up being heads of families with their children 
having smaller networks of friends and family to an extent that they end up lacking social circles 
they could use for protection.129 In case a displaced woman is alone, she ends up being at a higher 
risk of abuse, trafficking, and violence, which are similar to the challenges that LGBTQ+ people 
end up suffering.  
The displacement that Honduran families undergo is mainly aimed at protecting the 
interests of their children, including protecting them from being targeted or recruited by gangs. 
Being a young person in Honduras exposes one to more dangers than most young people in the 
world can ever imagine, whereby their lives are becoming worse as their governments lose control 
                                                
125 Alvina Erman et al., “Gender Dimensions of Disaster Risk and Resilience” (2021). 
126 Boerman, Family as a Social Construct in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala: Visibility and 
Vulnerability of Family Members of Individuals Targeted by Organized Criminal Groups. 
127 Nelson-Pollard, “Criminal Violence in Honduras as a Driver of Displacement.” 
128 Angelica M. Tello et al., “Unaccompanied Refugee Minors From Central America: 
Understanding Their Journey and Implications for Counselors,” The Professional Counselor 7, no. 4 
(2017): 360–374. 
129 Rachel H. Kappel et al., “Prevalence of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) and Associated 
Health Risks and Risk Behaviors among Young Women and Men in Honduras,” Child Abuse and 
Neglect 115 (2021): 104993. 
 
 37 
of crime and criminal organizations.130 If the gangs and criminal organizations cannot recruit the 
young people, they end up targeting them for kidnapping, trafficking, persecution, and execution. 
Honduras is characterized by multiple incidences of homicides and massacres that have forced their 
families to take drastic measures like leaving their homes.131 Research indicates that young men are 
forced to leave their birth homes because their government does not have any protection program 
for men aged between 16 and 24. In Honduras, displaced children account for at least 45% of the 
displaced population, which means that the people who suffer the most from the displacement are 
the people who can hardly protect themselves even in a country without a conflict. In Honduras, it 
has become increasingly difficult for a child to even get a decent education because of the role that 
gangs play in schools, whereby gangs can take over schools and use them for their illicit 
activities.132 The children also drop out of school at an early age when they are forced to leave their 
homes due to violence and the threat of violence from gang members.133 When children are 
displaced, they have to transfer schools, which results in higher costs for parents, as well as the 
challenges associated with weak infrastructure and school bureaucracy.  
Sometimes, families are even forced to separate as a survival strategy, as each of the family 
members may be facing a different threat that necessitates a unique fleeing strategy. In this regard, 
if only one family member is being threatened, he may elect to leave other family members behind 
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and go into hiding alone so as not to put them in danger.134 Over time, the social fabric ends up 
being broken down over time, such that in some cases entire neighborhoods have disintegrated as 
more people flee for their lives. The degree of risk, as well as the available resources, is an 
important contributing factor to the decision to flee, whereby displacement is international only if a 
person no longer thinks Honduras is safe.135 Due to lack of resources, many displaced persons end 
up remaining in the country in the long-term, even if research indicates that about nine out of ten 
displaced persons would want to leave Honduras in search of a better life elsewhere.136 Although 
the government of Honduras recognizes the problem of internal displacement, this has yet to result 
in positive outcomes like programs and policies aimed at addressing the issue. Even international 
organizations like UNHCR have been having difficulties achieving any permanent solutions for 
displaced people in Honduras, as many are not even tracked or registered.137 In addition, while the 
international and local organizations are providing humanitarian aid, these measures are merely 
temporary and unlikely to result in long-lasting solutions for the displaced people in Honduras.138 
The only way to reverse the situation would be to address the insecurity issues in Honduras 
resulting from gangs and organized crime, as well as coming up with a program for resettlement of 
internally displaced persons.  
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While the crime and violence in Honduras result from the inability of the government to 
keep criminal gangs and organized crime in check, the situation in Venezuela is a result of poor 
economic conditions – aggravated by the government’s inability to improve them.139.140 The 
country has been experiencing an economic collapse despite the nation having some of the largest 
crude oil reserves in the country. Venezuela, like many other nations in Latin America, is one of 
the countries that has been pushing towards authoritarian leadership after democracy has failed to 
keep the country’s political system stable over the years. Before its current crisis, which started in 
2010, Venezuela had so much petroleum revenue that the government was spending much on 
social programs that were so comprehensive that the government was offering free heating oil for 
the poor.141 The country’s collapse started in 2014 when its GDP reduced to a level that is lower 
than the level that the United States had experienced in the Great Depression. As many as 32 
million inhabitants of Venezuela were unable to afford food and even the country’s hospitals were 
so starved of resources that they did not even have basics like antibiotics and soap.142 As the 
economy became worse, the political system spiraled out of control, and accusations of voter 
intimidation and irregularities caused President Nicolas Maduro to experience street protests and 
                                                
139 Viviana García Pinzón and Jorge Mantilla, “Contested Borders: Organized Crime, Governance, 
and Bordering Practices in Colombia-Venezuela Borderlands,” Trends in Organized Crime (2020): 
1–17. 
140 Clark Digital Commons and Sam Kirsch, The Transformational Haze: Crisis, Shadow 
Economies, and Global Civil War on the Venezuela-Colombia Border, 2019, 
https://commons.clarku.edu/idce_masters_papers; Leda M. Pérez and Daniela Ugarte, “Venezuelan 
Women in Peru: At the Borders of Nationality, Gender, and Survival Migration,” Journal of 
International Migration and Integration (2021): 1–15. 
141 Van Praag, “Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis.” 
142 Kathleen R. Page et al., “Venezuela’s Public Health Crisis: A Regional Emergency,” The Lancet 
393, no. 10177 (2019): 1254–1260; Luisa Feline Freier, Isabel Berganza, and Cécile Blouin, “The 




even an uprising. While crime is the main contributor to the failure of Honduras, the decline of 
Venezuela was contributed by a wide range of interrelated factors.  
Instead of diversifying its economy like other countries with oil resources, Venezuela 
increased its dependence on oil revenues over the years such that it had very few other sources of 
revenue. As the prices of oil declined, the country started experiencing hard times, such that the 
economy eventually collapsed due to other factors like massive social spending, corruption, and 
economic mismanagement.143 The United States sanctions against the Venezuelan central bank, 
gold mining industry, and oil industry meant that not only did Venezuela no longer have access to 
the dollar for  international transactions, but it could not even take advantage of the resources in its 
possession.144 The sanctions that were designed to put pressure on the Maduro administration 
ended up resulting in the near-collapse of the whole country, which then forced people into poverty 
and the resulting protests against the government. Instead of introducing reforms as expected, 
Maduro got his supreme court to take away the power of the legislature in 2017 such that Maduro 
ended up as the de facto dictator of Venezuela.145 The power struggles in the country’s leadership 
changed a country that had been host to refugees from its neighbors over the years to become a 
humanitarian crisis. While in Honduras the displacement is primarily internal because there are 
parts of the nation that are still habitable, most displaced persons in Venezuela have no option but 
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to leave the country.146 Internal displacement may have negative effects on the lives of displaced 
people, but international displacement is even worse because the people are at the mercy of foreign 
nations. By the end of 2019, at least 4.6 million Venezuelans had become refugees, migrants, and 
asylum seekers, of whom most of them fled to Venezuela’s neighbors like Chile, Peru, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Colombia, and Argentina, among others.  
While Honduras has hundreds of thousands of misplaced people because of crime and 
localized violence, the violence in Venezuela is much more widespread and intense. The 
substantial movement of refugees and migrants from Venezuela has ended up creating a regional 
humanitarian crisis in Latin America, while at the same time presenting challenges for the host 
nations whose education and healthcare systems have been strained considerably.147 The journeys 
made by the migrants and refugees outside Venezuela have been made worse by their lack of 
access to clean water and food, vulnerability to gender-based violence, and inability to secure 
employment opportunities in host countries. In Venezuela, high levels of violent crime are just one 
of the contributors, with hyperinflation playing an even more important role in the ever-growing 
humanitarian crisis both inside Venezuela and the region.148 People have been forced to leave 
Venezuela for neighboring countries in large numbers because Venezuela can no longer offer them 
the essential services they need to support their basic needs. In addition to the challenging 
conditions in Venezuela, even the journey to their destination countries is worse, and many of them 
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end up losing or risking their lives in their travels.149 Some of the issues they face include safety-
related issues due to abuse from criminal networks and armed groups, exploitation, xenophobia, 
and dangerous terrain.  
While even the men are at risk, children and women are especially vulnerable to gender-
based and sexual violence and exploitation, including rape, and assault at the hands of the people 
they find, as well as fellow travelers. Whenever they need a source of income, many of them are 
forced to engage in transactional sex, which eventually results in prostitution and trafficking.150 
Research on the migrants and refugees who travel to Colombia from Venezuela indicated that it is 
common for women and girls to engage in transactional sex, with mothers often encouraging their 
daughters to engage in the practice.151 Since the displaced persons from Venezuela are many more 
than the displaced persons from Honduras, the problems faced by the Venezuelans are much more 
far-reaching.152 Humanitarian organizations like the UNHCR indicate that a high proportion of the 
girls and women among the displaced use transactional sex as a means of ensuring their own 
survival due to the challenging conditions.153 There has been an increasing level of awareness 
across the world about the situation in Venezuela, and efforts are being put by NGOs, the United 
Nations (UN), and host nations to come up with measures of improving support for the migrants 
and refugees. A solidarity conference that was hosted by the European Union also focused on how 
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the international community can start working on a means of addressing the issues related to the 
violence and human displacement in Venezuela.154  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion  
Currently, climate change does not seem to be an important contributor to the human 
displacement problem, at least not in Syria, Yemen, Venezuela, and Honduras. The impact of 
climate change is overshadowed by other underlying factors, most of which are the result of 
governments in these countries losing their control of society. Loss of control of society is a sign 
that the government is not only losing its legitimacy, but it does not hold sufficient power to keep 
all criminal elements in check. Without a means of preventing criminal organizations or militant 
groups from terrorizing citizens, governments across the countries have indirectly resulted in the 
displacement of millions of their citizens. The large-scale displacement has resulted in 
unprecedented humanitarian crises in Latin America and the Middle East, as well we the rest of the 
world where the displaced people end up as refugees or immigrants. Humanitarian organizations 
like the UNHCR and host countries have had their resources overextended so much, and there is no 
end in sight. The human displacement resulting from the political turmoil and criminal activity in 
those places has been difficult to handle because they require far-reaching reforms instead of 
stopgap interventions like humanitarian aid. While humanitarian aid is beneficial, it is a temporary 
solution for any nation, and the only way to protect people in the long-term is by working with the 
global communities to promote representative leadership and peaceful resolution of political 
differences. The global community can also offer support to the government to prevent militias and 
splinter groups from challenging its authority and putting the lives of citizens at risk.  
As discussed above, the displacement in the four countries has been the result of political 
changes, including disagreements among political factions, and the inability of governments to 
provide their people with security. When faced with these challenges, fully functional governments 
are supposed to be able to protect their people and work with the international community to ensure 
that their authority is not challenged. While international relations played a role, the role was more 
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about how countries interact with each other and share their resources after people have been 
displaced. For all the countries in this study, international relations played a unifying role in that it 
enables countries to offer refuge to displaced people while at the same time donating resources to 
humanitarian aid. In both the Middle East and Latin America, neighboring nations play host to 
displaced people, and international organizations like the UNHCR give them humanitarian aid. The 
challenges, which are supposed to be localized within countries or regions, have ended up 
becoming widespread global crises that need the participation of the global community. The people 
who have been misplaced in the different countries have had to immigrate to other countries where 
their presence is causing pressure on existing resources. The people who end up as immigrants or 
as refugees are not usually part of the planning systems of host countries, which ends up ruining 
their plans. As a result, many of the host countries across the world have been having a hard time 
hosting displaced people, with many even setting quotas.  
In all the countries studied here, governments have been losing their hold on societies, 
which has resulted in either splinter groups emerging and fighting for power, or crime and violence 
increasing. In the Middle East, weakening regimes have resulted in power vacuums that have 
caused different political groups to engage in conflicts that have put the lives of the people at risk. 
The political infighting in Yemen and Syria has resulted in the displacement of people in large 
numbers such that there is a humanitarian crisis in the Middle East and Europe. In their struggle to 
hold on to power, the governments of Yemen and Syria have ended up destabilizing their own 
countries and forced the people to leave their homes. In Yemen and Syria, human displacement 
takes both the form of internal and external displacement, with the number of displaced people 
increasing over time, with Syria having more displaced people because its conflict has been longer. 
In the Middle East, human displacement is the result of civil war in which the ruling elite have 
managed to push their people to fight against each other. The lay people have been driven to fight 
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against each other by being convinced that their political and religious differences are supposed to 
cause unnecessary friction in their societies. An intervention in this respect would be mass 
education to teach people how best they can address their differences without resorting to violence 
that ends up breaking down their societies.  
In Latin America, the pattern of human displacement is different from the causes of 
displacement in the Middle East, whereby direct politics plays less of a role in the conflicts and the 
resulting displacement. In both Honduras and Venezuela, the inability of the governments to 
protect the people has resulted in both countries being taken over by organized crime and gangs. 
While in Honduras the main contributor for the displacement is crime and violence, in Venezuela 
equally important are deteriorating economic conditions and political instability. Since the violence 
and crime in Honduras are localized, the displaced people are fewer, and the displacement is 
localized within the country even if people want to leave. The situation in Venezuela is different in 
that the political and economic instability is countrywide, and people are leaving the country in 
droves. At the latest count, at least five million people have left Venezuela for neighboring 
countries. Though larger in scope, the Venezuelan crisis underscores the similar roots in all four 
countries – governments that are losing or have lost control over their societies. While the 
government losing control is an important factor, equally important is the need to teach the people 
to hold their governments accountable and inform them it is possible to get the leadership they 
deserve. The reforms are bound to be challenging, but are not impossible, especially if the global 
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